A new phenomenon: emotions run high for analytic philosophy

Abstract

In the present paper, the author replies to the critique of his concept of the essential characteristics of analytic philosophy and the periods in its history, advanced by Vitalii Tselishchev in an earlier issue of this journal (2018, Vol. 11, No. 2). Such critique can be shown to be untenable from the standpoint of both the ethics of debate and the standards of rational inquiry. Not only does Tselishchev fail to understand the essence of this author’s arguments against Aaron Preston’s attempt to dethrone analytic philosophy, and even less so for the main idea of the concept elaborated in response, but, most importantly, he risks appearing ignorant of the tasks of a historian of philosophy and of the very nature of philosophy itself. The author insists on the validity of all major points he originally made, i.e. that analytic philosophy is not a body of doctrines or even topics, but a specific philosophical practice (and, for that matter, the one that surpasses all others in efficiency); that key attributes of such practice can be found long before the 20th century and by no means within the Western tradition alone; finally, that the rise of self-reflection, just as with any other grand style of philosophy, should be adopted as the foremost criterion for dividing its history into meaningful periods.