On the (In)admissibility of Lying: a Case in Kant

Abstract

In his essay "On the Pretended Right to Lie out of Philanthropy" Immanuel Kant contends that lying is totally inadmissible even when telling the truth might threaten the well-being of a third person. This paper seeks to demonstrate that both the main thesis and the arguments provided by Kant in its support are invalid, and aims to prove that a) ‘do not lie’ cannot be recognized as the dominating moral principle, in particular when compared to such principles as ‘do not harm’, ‘be just’, ‘care for another’s welfare’; b) anyone’s moral obligations to an evildoer are inferior to the obligations the same person has to a friend and a guest; c) the ethical problem does not consist in the choice between philanthropy and honesty, but rather between the honesty in the face of a malefactor and the loyalty to the obligations one has assumed to a friend and guest. The approach here proposed suggests the actualization of other in one’s moral attitude to the world, whereas for Kant’s practical philosophy the other has no relevance.