In simple words: McDowell reads Wittgenstein

Abstract

The article examines the arguments of John McDowell in favor of quietism as the main methodological attitude of Ludwig Wittgenstein. McDowell shows that we cannot ignore Wittgenstein’s quietism without compromising our understanding of his ideas about lin­guistic meaning and rule-following. The main obstacle to understanding the role of qui­etism in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is the opposition between reason and nature. There­fore, the article discusses the arguments in favor of what McDowell calls Wittgenstein’s naturalized platonism, which aims to overcome this opposition. McDowell reveals the essence of naturalized platonism with the help of the concept of “second nature” that characterizes human conceptual capacities. The article also proposes such an understand­ing of Wittgenstein’s quietism, in which it is not only a theoretical but also a practical at­titude to the perception of the world.