Virtual realism, information ontology of consciousness and structural realism in the philosophy of David Chalmers

Abstract

The article presents the main provisions of the theory of virtual realism, described by the contemporary analytical philosopher David Chalmers in his recent articles. In contrast to the proponents of “virtual fictionalism”, who believe that virtual objects are fictional and illusory, the philosopher defends the position that such objects can be regarded as having the same causal and functional qualities as the physical objects familiar to us. Using the concept of “digital object”, Chalmers demonstrates that all the components of a virtual space are nothing more than data structures which have certain virtual properties. Based on the concepts of non-reductive functionalism and minimal computationalism, the philosopher also discusses the status of phenomenal consciousness in virtual worlds, which, in his opinion, can be interpreted in the spirit of epiphenomenalism, computation­alism or Cartesian dualism. The article also presents Chalmers’ well-known argument against the hypothesis of global skepticism, based on the theory of conceptual structural realism: the philosopher believes that there are such natural properties and relations that stand in certain nomic and causal connections with each other and with our experience. It follows that even if the simulation hypothesis is correct, we can count on the truth of some of our scientific theories, which are positive structural statements. The above con­siderations are intended to form the basis of a consistent theory of virtual worlds and in­formational spaces, which the philosopher is currently working on.