The Lonesome Mind or an attempt of an Existential Philosophy of Mind
Mijuskovic, B.L. Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis. New York: Brill, 2018. 520 pp.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2021-14-3-184-192Keywords:
Ben Lazare Mijuskovic, existentialism, loneliness, philosophy of life, philosophy of mindAbstract
This article is a review of Ben Lazare Mijuskovic’s book Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis (2018). The problem of the dividedness of the contemporary philosophy into the two different traditions has recently become apparent. This is evidenced by the growth of a number of investigations aiming to embrace contemporary thought in its wholeness. Among such studies is the new work of American philosopher Ben Lazare Mijuskovic. He attempts to defend the human microcosm from the threat of its neglection by philosophical naturalism. However, it is not only Mijuskovic’s anti-naturalistic position that is interesting. He also provides an in-depth analysis of such an Existenzial of the human life as loneliness. The rich philosophical material drawn by the author is an indisputable merit of the study. However, this same merit also constitutes a problem. Mijuskovic’s arguments are reduced to a mere repetition of the philosophical ideas of the past and are thus unable to undermine contemporary naturalism. Meanwhile, the parts of the study in which the phenomenon of loneliness is discussed are the most interesting part of the book. Mijuskovic discusses loneliness as the feeling of loneliness per se and does not replace its phenomenological analysis by an economical investigation or by an evolutionary explanation. The author’s recognition of the significance of the content of conscious experience leads him to a disagreement with naturalism and to the acceptance of the position of substance dualism along with its known shortcomings. It seems that such a move is not at all necessary. In order for the content of our conscious experience to become significant, there is no need to exaggerate the ontological autonomy of the very conscious experience. It is always possible to commit to «weaker» ontological views without abandoning the scientific worldview and common sense.