David Chalmers’ conceivability argument

Abstract

The conceivability argument, or the zombie argument, is the most prominent and debated argument against physicalism, the dominant view on the nature of consciousness. The ar­ticle reveals the key ideas of the discussion about this argument. The author presents a simplified version of the argument, introducing the basic concepts and making impor­tant remarks. Then an adapted version of the argument given by David Chalmers, the main contemporary critic of physicalism in the philosophy of consciousness, is given. The basic concepts and content of the argument's assumptions are clarified. Then the author discusses the main ways to reject the argument: rejecting the problem itself, showing the incompatibility of the existence of zombies with other philosophical views, demon­strating the failure of the argument itself. The rest of the text focuses on such criticisms. An analysis of the most promising ways to attack the argument is given. It is argued that the failure to accept the representation of zombies, the a posteriori physicalism and the so-called epistemic view attack the premise that zombies are conceivable. The strat­egy of phenomenal concepts rejects the premise, according to which, zombies are possi­ble. The falsification of the argument shows the failure of the argument as a whole. After the analysis of these strategies, the author’s view of the perspective criticism of the argu­ment, as well as important comments on the position of the argument in the contemporary philosophical discussion, are expressed. According to the author’s argument, the critics of the zombie argument make a convincing case against it, however the falsification of the conceivability argument does not show what is actually wrong with the argument.