The metaphysics of Nothing and punctuation marks: Heidegger, Kant, Carnap

Abstract

The article discusses the language tools used by M. Heidegger when he turns the word “Nothing” into a basic term and concept of metaphysics. In his work “What is meta­physics?” three stages of transformation are distinguished: the first two of them are char­acterized by a permutation of the dash in German fixed expressions; the last stage in­volves a substitution of the direct meaning of the word for a figurative one. Heidegger’s thesis about the primacy of Nothing in relation to negation is critically analyzed. The method of introducing the concept of Nothing in Kant and Kant’s table of Nothing are discussed. A comparison of Kant’s and Heidegger’s strategies in the formation of the pseudo-concept of Nothing is made. Carnap’s criticism of Heidegger's philosophy is considered as partially independent of his criticism of metaphysics as a whole.