Является ли тождество личности условием моральной от­ветственности?

Abstract

Many philosophers accept that moral responsibility is closely connected with personal identity. They usually claim that personal identity is a necessary condition for moral re­sponsibility since nobody should be blamed or praised for actions that they did not per­form. This article considers three paradoxes discovered in the process of a conceptual analysis of relations between moral responsibility and personal identity. The criteria of identity paradox states that we either cannot determine whether the identity of a person has survived in the duplication case, or we do so with petitio principii. The moral respon­sibility paradox shows that moral responsibility cannot be the symptom of personal iden­tity. The survival paradox displays that feeling of “being me” cannot be the symptom of personal identity. The article ends with a suggestion to either improve the theory of moral responsibility or adopt a metaphysics that could dissolve these paradoxes.