Phenomenology without a transcendental subject: neurophenomenology and enactivism in search of a first-person perspective

Abstract

The article discusses one of the most rapidly developing projects of modern philosophy, namely, the integration project of phenomenology and naturalism. The article highlights the first-person perspective as instrumental for such integration. The author outlines two key directions: neurophenomenology (F. Varela) and enactivism (S. Gallager). Explana­tions are given on how exactly the first-person perspective is going to be included in the cognitive research of science. The article examines the methodology of the project, in particular, whether it is based on the methods of the classical phenomenology of E. Husserl or on the understanding of phenomenology in analytical philosophy of con­sciousness. The feasibility of the integrated methodology is discussed. The author ex­presses doubts whether the actual implementation of the project is going to comply with its phenomenological program. It is argued that we observe a certain obscurity in the use of natural and transcendental attitudes, the difficulty of interpreting the “external” and “internal”, the ambiguity of deduction of the body from the “bodily experience”, etc. Spe­cial attention is given to the idea of transcendental first-person perspective and non-repre­sentation of the first person in the world.