Evil and atheism: Ontological and ethical prerequisites in arguments from evil

Abstract

One of the main objections to the existence of God is the so-called argument from evil. In a general form, it says that if a good and omnipotent God existed, He would necessarily prevent many evils we encounter in the actual world. Yet these evils do occur. Therefore, the good and omnipotent God does not exist. This argument has not only theoretical, but also practical aspects. Especially, if one decides in favor of atheism, he is guided by a particular understanding of what evil is and what a benevolent and omnipotent God has to do in order to prevent its occurrence. The goal of this article is to reveal the concepts of evil and «divine obligations» that underlie the atheistic motivation. In this case, as an ex­ample of logical argument from evil I consider the classic argument by John L. Mackie, whereas as an example of an inductive argument from evil is taken the well-known argu­ment developed by William L. Rowe. It is shown that despite the fact that from a formal point of view, these arguments refer to different types of arguments from evil, they are based on similar ideas about both the nature of evil and God’s obligations in relation to his creation. It is also shown that atheistic arguments from evil suggest, on the one hand, a quasi-dualistic account of the nature of evil, according to which evil is the absolute op­posite of good. On the other hand, it seems to claim God's subordination to the welfare-oriented moral, which implies the concern for the welfare of all rational and sentient be­ings to be an unconditional duty.