The formation of the concept of universality in ethics

Abstract

Universality in ethics is seen as one of the constitutive characteristics of morality. The fact that the concept of universality is often thoroughly criticized in modern concepts does not abolish it, but rather confirms the validity of this statement. In the history of thought, the idea of universality arises quite early in connection with the consideration of moral issues. However, the formation of the concept of universality occurs in early Mod­ern philosophy simultaneously and in connection with the formation of the philosophical concept of morality. This process is clearly visible in the works of British authors, who focus on the understanding of morality as such, and its constitutive features. On the basis of these authors' teachings, the paper highlights and analyzes the key connotations of the concept of universality, and also clarifies its role in the construction of the philosophi­cal concept of morality. First, universality was interpreted as an omnipresence of moral notions. It is shown that, despite the vulnerability of considering universality as an om­nipresence of moral notions, it should be noted that it expressed the idea of moral equal­ity: all people are equal as moral subjects, all are able to judge competently about moral good and evil and do not need the instructions from any authority. Moral notions as om­nipresent were contrasted with particular considerations such as corporate, group, class, religious, etc. And thereby the specificity of moral consciousness was confirmed. Second, universality was considered as a defining characteristic of moral requirements, decisions, and assessments. In this sense it was interpreted in the way that moral requirement ad­dressed to all, and all decisions and assessments are essentially impartial.