Thinking about (and of) the infinite as an epistemological problem of Kojève’s philosophical system

Abstract

The ontological-temporal dualism developed by Kojève in opposition to Hegel’s onto­logy and Heidegger’s anthropology is accompanied by a division of people into “non-philosophers,” “philosophers” and “sages.” Their differences are determined by their different epistemological premises (Koyré) and contemplative-active attitudes (Marx). The author argues that Kojève’s epistemological premises not only determine his onto­logy and anthropology, but also destroy his philosophy of history, which requires a change of the contemplative-active attitude in order to be preserved. The difference in epistemological attitudes consists in a different understanding of the possibility of thinking about the infinite. The idea of ​​the infinite is viewed as a consequence of the fi­niteness of man and the world in the context of the ontological argument (Anselm, Descartes). A “philosopher” differs from a “non-philosopher” in that a philosophical understanding of the cogito does not require a hypostasis or a substantivation of the idea of the infinite as infinite thinking or, alternatively, as the thinking of an infinite super-being. Therefore, the cogito is inherent in a mortal human being autonomously, reflexively and self-trancendentally. Kojève argues that the thinkable infinity is “poten­tial,” i.e., scholastically speaking, it is what can be called “limitlessness” (inter­minatum), whereas “actual” infinity (infinitum) is considered unthinkable and reducible to “potential” infinity. Reducing the “actuality” of infinity to its “potentiality” is in­compatible with faith in God, and, therefore, epistemological differences are not re­solved discursively; they are a matter of the choice of “worldview” (Weltanschauung). At the same time, according to Kojève, the epistemological “mistake” that made the “actual” infinity (as well as the God of Abrahamic religions) possible was heuristic­ally productive and via secularization helped modern science to appear. However, the reduction of “actual” infinity precludes the implementation of the most famous of Kojève’s ideas: his idea of ​​the “end of history” is temporalized and, thus, loses its abso­lute necessity. In light of this, a “philosopher” must actively participate in the imple­mentation of history and finish history. Only that way she can become a “sage.”