How an Empirical Foundation of Theoretical Natural Science can be Possible

(the Case of Modern Cosmology)

Abstract

The paper examines the problem of empirical foundation of theoretical natural science as exemplified by modern cosmology. The author gives a critical analysis of the concepts of post-positivist philosophy of science (Norwood Hanson, Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos) according to which a solid empirical foundation of modern theories in natural science is impossible because of the theoretical load carried by empirical data. The aforementioned thinkers contend that the conceptual interpretation of experiments and, above all, the inclusion of the theory under verification in the process of interpretation, make the independent experimental control of theories impossible. The paper demonstrates that such hypotheses are erroneous. It shows that they are based on overemphasizing the holistic strategy in the investigation of the process of cognition and on the lack of due attention to analytic methods. An analysis of the actual state of affairs in science allows to conclude that despite the ‘theoretical load’, the conceptually interpreted data contain a layer of empirical knowledge that does not include the theory under verification. In this layer the facts are formed that ensure the possibility of a paradigmatically independent control of the theory and a sufficiently solid empirical foundation of it.