The irrational part of the world soul and the individual soul according to Plutarch of Chaeronea

Abstract

The paper submits to a close examination the passage 35а1–36b5 from Plato's Timaeus. Two basic ancient traditions of interpretation are singled out: the first one, reflected in Cornford's translation which is dependent on Proclus's commentary, and the second one, exemplified by Jowett's understanding of the passage and by the views shared by his followers; this latter approach is shown to go back to Plutarch's version given in his essay On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus, influenced by that thinker's literal diachronic understanding of the creation as described by Plato, which prompted Plutarch to regard the soul of the Timaeus as a mixture of four essential elements rather than the three explicitly postulated by Plato, and to assert the existence of the evil version of the World soul. On the account of this theory, however, it will be wrong, as the author of the present article argues, to label Plutarch's concept of the soul as dualistic: he is rather a metaphysical opportunist pursuing above all ethical interests.