Pictorial space, content and surface: Wollheim’s theory of twofoldness

Abstract

This paper concerns Richard Wollheim’s theory of twofoldness, one of the most acclaimed analytical theories of pictorial representation. Wollheim has pointed to the structural distinction of perceiving the pictures from seeing the objects and from face-to-face situations, which resulted in his putting forward the theory of seeing-in and twofoldness. Such theory presupposes a two-way simultaneous seeing of the object of representation and of the material surface of the image. This paper concerns Richard Wollheim’s theory of twofoldness, one of the most acclaimed analytical theories of pictorial representation. Wollheim has pointed to the structural distinction of perceiving the pictures from seeing the objects and from face-to-face situations, which resulted in his putting forward the theory of seeing-in and twofoldness. Such theory presupposes a two-way simultaneous seeing of the object of representation and of the material surface of the image. Considering the basic influences, features and shortcomings of Wollheim’s theory, the present author shows that it is largely limited to artistic images. From a detailed reconstruction and a critique of it he proceeds to offer an interpretation based on spatially oriented definitions of twofoldness (Bence Nanay, John Kulvicki) and involving the actual distinction between representational content of a picture and its figurative content. Content of the first type includes all spatial relations which can be seen in an image, that of the second type everything which can be seen in it and described in non-abstract terms. Though in his writings on twofoldness Wollheim never used this distinction, it allows to deduce a fairly balanced definition of twofoldness as a holistic visual experience of pictorial surface (i.e., a material object in viewer’s egocentric space) and of representational content (i.e., semantically active spatial relations which one sees in the picture). Being devoid of Wollheim’s psychologism while maintaining his focus on visuality, this interpretation aspires to be a useful instrument for a non-reductionist description of pictorial experience and of the ontological duality of pictures. Moreover, it provides some opportunities for applying Wollheim’s theory beyond the contexts of analytical philosophy of pictures, effectively connecting it to the problems of phenomenological and hermeneutic theories of image.