Negativity in earnest? Toward the problem of Heidegger's interpretation of negativity in the philosophy of Hegel

Abstract

The present article offers an analysis of the methodological models used by both Hegel and Heidegger to approach the problem of negativity. The authors seek to reveal what makes Hegel's and, on the other hand, Heidegger's inquiry into the origins of philosophy so special. Heidegger builds his critique of Hegel's doctrine of negativity on a more general interpretation of speculative thinking. It can be shown, however, that the Freiburg philosopher effectively reduces the role of negativity in Hegel's system to that of one of its parts which Hegel himself would not take too much 'in earnest', letting it be leveled under the pressure of the speculative principle and thus included and locked within the system. What the authors set to demonstrate is that in fact an essential and necessary characteristic of the speculative system is self-expenditure: this is prerequisite to its continuation and to its functioning historically, which, in its turn, means precisely positing negativity in itself.