In defense of semantic externalism. Hilary Putnam’s arguments

Putnam, H. Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016. 238 pp.

Authors

  • Igor D. Dzhokhadze Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2017-10-1-154-162

Keywords:

metaphysical realism, externalism, conceptual relativity, apperception, qualia, McDowell, Noё, James, Davidson

Abstract

In his Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity, Hilary Putnam puts forward a number of modified arguments in defense of semantic externalism, arguing that not only “meanings aren’t in the head”, but our thoughts and ideas as well. Reference of the terms used in speech, as well as content of statements and representations, is determined not by mental states of a speaker (member of some linguistic community), but by "the environment itself", i.e. external factors – natural and social. Putnam refuses to endorse John McDowell’s claim that all perceptual experiences are initially conceptualized. On his view, sensations “play no special epistemic role”, for they lack propositional content. It is apperceptions that are conceptually articulated, not qualia, Putnam insists.

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Published

2017-03-13

Issue

Section

REVIEWS AND BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEYS

How to Cite

[1]
2017. In defense of semantic externalism. Hilary Putnam’s arguments: Putnam, H. Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016. 238 pp. Filosofskii zhurnal | Philosophy Journal. 10, 1 (Mar. 2017), 154–162. DOI:https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2017-10-1-154-162.