In defense of semantic externalism. Hilary Putnam’s arguments
Putnam, H. Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016. 238 pp.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2017-10-1-154-162Keywords:
metaphysical realism, externalism, conceptual relativity, apperception, qualia, McDowell, Noё, James, DavidsonAbstract
In his Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity, Hilary Putnam puts forward a number of modified arguments in defense of semantic externalism, arguing that not only “meanings aren’t in the head”, but our thoughts and ideas as well. Reference of the terms used in speech, as well as content of statements and representations, is determined not by mental states of a speaker (member of some linguistic community), but by "the environment itself", i.e. external factors – natural and social. Putnam refuses to endorse John McDowell’s claim that all perceptual experiences are initially conceptualized. On his view, sensations “play no special epistemic role”, for they lack propositional content. It is apperceptions that are conceptually articulated, not qualia, Putnam insists.