Theorizing about consciousness: an epistemological prolegomenon. Part I

Abstract

This article discusses the following problems. What is the correct way to pose questions about consciousness nowadays? What exactly are we interested in when we investigate the nature of consciousness? Wherefrom should the criteria for the ‘rightness’ of answers be derived? Should we expect to come up eventually with a final theory that explains everything about consciousness, or rather accept that the horizon of questioning about consciousness will always become more and more complicated, differentiated and removed further and further from us? The search for the solutions to these problems requires a preliminary analysis of the whole spectrum of human intentions that drive forward to theorizing as such. We will try to justify that the internal multiplicity of this spectrum appears not to be accidental, particularly, the assumed exclusiveness of objective approaches to consciousness will be submitted to a critique, to explain why it is wrong to consider the quest for objective truth among the basic theoretic intentions, especially when it comes to thematizing consciousness. We will also argue that the phenomenological project of Dasein-analyses, in its original version, appears to be successfully exhausted, for modern science has adopted most of phenomenological discoveries, at least on their technical side, which is reflected in several methods of computer modeling of cognitive and behavioral processes, and such branches of theoretical research as neurophenomenology, microphenomenology, cardiophenomenology and others. This suggests exploring the possibility of principally new ways of questioning about consciousness.