Henri Bergson’s Philosophical Intuition as reflexions on the nature of philosophical creativity

Abstract

Philosophical intuition is the address Henri Bergson gave at the Fourth International Congress of philosophy held in Bologna in 1911. Here Bergson sets out an interpretation of the history of philosophy which is alternative to the Hegelian one; he also expounds his own ideas on the subject. According to Bergson, every philosophical doctrine grows out of a primary intuition which can, in some part, be expressed through images, but remains impenetrable to concepts. Such intuition defines whatever new, original or genuinely creative is contained in the doctrine. This implies that all intuitions are equal; accordingly, history of philosophy makes no progress. This conclusion, however, is contradicted by the second part of the paper in which Bergson, while expounding his own doctrine, in a certain sense still prefers, be it voluntary or not, a 'higher position'. The present paper reveals the three meanings of intuition in Bergson: 1) intuition as the core of philosophical doctrine; 2) intuition as a way of penetrating the perpetually changing reality, the becoming; 3) intuition as a maxim of behavior that allows man to change his condition radically.