The concept of proposition in analytical philosophy: from classical interpretation to act‑type theory of propositions

Abstract

The concept of proposition is one of the most significant in analytical philosophy. The article implicitly develops theories of propositions based on logical-semantic concepts. The comprehension of these concepts is pivotal in delineating the ontological and epistemological character of philosophical teachings. However, within the Russian philosophical tradition, there are no specialized studies on theories of proposition and, accordingly, no thematic publications. Concurrently, Western authors underscore the theoretical comprehension of the phenomenon of propositional content in linguistic expression as a promising field of research. The development of this field has the potential to resolve a number of methodological, ontological and epistemological problems. This article constitutes a review of the theory of propositions in analytical philosophy, with a focus on contrasting the classical concept, dating back to the work of Russell and Wittgenstein, with the modern act-type theory of propositions. The present discussion concentrates principally on Carnap’s reductionist project, paying particular attention to the concept of propositional content from the perspective of speech act theory.