Kant, Berkeley and “Copernican upheaval”: a new format of the old standing issue

Authors

  • Vladimir K. Shokhin Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2025-18-2-122-134

Keywords:

idealism, realism, external objects, perceptions, ideations, virtual polemical dialogues, Kant, Berkeley, the Vijňānavādins, Śaňkara

Abstract

The author deals with the historical context of the eminent Kantian Copernican upheaval in philosophy, which from his point of view cannot be correctly conceived without proper understanding of the real correlation of critical philosophy with Berkleyan idealism. In spite of the historical facts that Kant insisted on his large debt to Hume and tried to prove his utter incompatibility of his theory with Berkeley’s doctrine whom he had pretendedly utterly refuted, “philosophical facts” show the opposite. The author offers an experience in the shape of a virtual letter of the Bishop of Cloyne to his posthumous opponent wherefrom issues that Kant only accomplished what he had started, whereas in a dialectical way, i.e. by peculiar restoration of realism, while it was just Berkleyan laboratory wherein tools for the revolution under discussion were elaborated. A justified criticism of Kantian classification of idealism is also contained in the virtual Berkeley’s letter as well. In conclusion intercultural parallels are offered between Berkeleyan idea­lism and that of the Vijňānavāda Buddhism and with Śaňkara’s refutation of the Buddhist attempt to remove external objects. As in the case of Berkeley and Kant, here the same dialectical interplay of revolution and restoration took place inasmuch as Śaňkara was also deeply indented to his opponents.

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Published

2025-05-17

Issue

Section

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

How to Cite

[1]
2025. Kant, Berkeley and “Copernican upheaval”: a new format of the old standing issue. Filosofskii zhurnal | Philosophy Journal. 18, 2 (May 2025), 122–134. DOI:https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2025-18-2-122-134.