Nozick’s proviso and basic income

Abstract

Robert Nozick formulated the libertarian theory of justice, which condemns any form of redistribution of wealth and income. However, Nozick himself recognized the “Lock­ean proviso”, which limits the scope of permissible appropriations and transfers of pro­perty. Nozick offered his own interpretation of this proviso, which would exclude any re­distributive implications inherent in stricter readings of this condition. This article exa­mines whether Nozick’s proviso succeeds in avoiding redistributive implications. Various objections to the standard interpretation of Nozick’s proviso raised by Gerald Cohen, Hil­lel Steiner, John Arthur, Brian Powell, Eric Mack, and Steven Daskal motivate us to re­think the proviso. To this end, three redistributive reinterpretations of Nozick’s proviso, proposed by Peter Vallentyne, Matt Zwolinski, and Steven Daskal, are considered. Both Vallentyne and Zwolinski propose using Nozick’s proviso as an argument for basic in­come, although their approaches differ. Vallentyne suggests that Nozick’s proviso im­poses compensation obligations on appropriators of natural resources, then distributing that compensation in proportion to the extent to which the appropriation has made some­one worse off. But since everyone has the right to a minimum compensation payment, it can be provided in the form of a basic income. Zwolinski focuses more on the prop­erty system as a whole, but highlights the fact that its positive externalities do not af­fect certain individuals. And the most inclusive way to reach everyone who is entitled to compensation is to pay it as a basic income. Daskal proposes to limit the payment of compensation for violation of the proviso to job requirements. However, an analysis of Daskal’s argument shows that he fails to justify these requirements, and therefore his line of argument leads to a dilemma between a basic income or an even more egalitarian policy – market socialism.