Schelling on being and predication in his essay contra Fichte of 1806

Abstract

This article explores the intricate relationship between Schelling, Being, and Predication, framed by two core themes that shape its argumentation. The first theme addresses the continuity between the System of Identity and Schelling’s System of Freedom, particu­larly through a critique of Fichte’s idealistic conception of Being. Schelling counters Fichte’s inadvertent dualism between consciousness and its real content by affirming the primacy of nature and proposing a realist unity. Drawing from Hölderlin’s thesis on the trans-reflexive nature of Being, Schelling asserts the identity of ideal and real grounds as the foundation of a unified reality. The second theme, concerning the theory of the bond, marks a profound shift in Schelling’s metaphysical framework, challenging the legitimacy of a system grounded solely in reason. The notion that no being can fully coincide with itself, thereby undermining the establishment of an identity in absolute terms, destabilizes the systematic vision of philosophy as the identity of principle and de­velopment. This critique extends to the conception of reason as a substantive principle, disrupting the foundational assumptions of other systematic thinkers of modernity. Through these interconnected themes, the article reveals how Schelling’s thought recon­figures the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of modern philosophy.