Information concepts of consciousness: D.I. Dubrovsky and D. Chalmers
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2024-17-3-135-149Keywords:
Dubrovsky, Chalmers, mind-brain problem, subjective reality, informational model of consciousness, materialism, physicalismAbstract
The article is devoted to the study of the grounds for comparative analysis of the ideas of D.I. Dubrovsky and representatives of analytic philosophy of mind, in particular, D. Chalmers. D.I. Dubrovsky began to develop the information concept of consciousness several decades before analytic philosophers. However, a conceptual work is necessary to establish thematic unity. D.I. Dubrovsky is known for his critical attitude to analytic philosophy of mind. The article explores the grounds for D.I. Dubrovsky’s criticism of the concepts of philosophers of mind, in particular, D. Chalmers. Constructive criticism is possible provided that the terms of the concept being criticized are understood. The main question of the article concerns the extent to which the terms of Dubrovsky’s theory are similar in meaning to the terms of analytic philosophy of consciousness, in particular, the concept of D. Chalmers. The possibility of “translating” the terms of D.I. Dubrovsky’s theory into the language of philosophy of mind in order to include his ideas in the field of research of analytic philosophers is evaluated. Since D.I. Dubrovsky’s position was formed in the 1960s, the historical and philosophical context is taken into account when considering the provisions of his theory. Some provisions of the philosophy of dialectical materialism are given, which may allow modern thinkers who are not sufficiently familiar with Soviet philosophy to understand D.I. Dubrovsky’s ideas more deeply. The article analyzes the understanding of D.I. Dubrovsky and D. Chalmers of such terms as “mind/consciousness”, “qualia”, “information”, “materialism/physicalism”, which form the basis of the concepts of each of the philosophers. It is demonstrated that the same terms conceal different contents, which leads to mutual misunderstanding of the parties – D.I. Dubrovsky and representatives of analytic philosophy of mind – which is aggravated by the difference of methodological approaches. It is argued that D.I. Dubrovsky’s theory in the context of analytic philosophy of mind represents a variant of the identity theory and can allow to solve easy problems, while taking into account the specificity of first-person consciousness.